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Duncan research files of |
1840-1850 Marshall Co. IA Census
No Duncan indexed
1860 Marshall Co. IA Census
Iowa Twp.
Pg.845, #40-42, Charlotte DUNCAN 63 VA (blank) $0-$0
Giles 45 IN farmer $2000-$600
John W. 17, Elias J. 15 IN
Mary A. 10, Huldah A. 7 IN
(MAD: Charlotte Murdock, widow of George Duncan of Newberry Co. SC; see 1909 History of Clay Co. IN; 1870 Boone Co. IA census; plainly John "W." Duncan)
(MAD: Giles Duncan in 1850 Greene Co. IN census; Giles Duncan mar. S/L.C. Arney 3/19/1865 Marshall Co. IA; 1870 Boone Co. IA census as "Chas", wife Louisa C.; 1880 Boone Co. IA census as Jiles Duncan, wife Caroline)
LeGrand Twp.
Pg.891, #401-375, Jonah DUNCAN 27 OH farm laborer $300-$450
Sarah A. 18 OH
Charamanda (f) 2 IA
(MAD: Jonah Duncan mar. Sarah A. McCool 1/27/1856 Miami Co. OH per IGI)
1870 Marshall Co. IA Census
Green Castle Twp. (faint) (also from Kathy Cawley 11/2001)
Pg.338, #6-7, DUNCAN, Elias J. 24 IN farmer $0-$0
Maria C.J. 24 IN keeping house
Mary J. 1 IA
(MAD: 1880 Lincoln Co. Dakota Ter. census)
Iowa Twp.
Pg.350, #30-30, COLLINS, Seth 45 VT farmer $5280-$700
Mary 35 VT keeping house
DUNCAN, Henry 19 WI farm laborer
Jefferson Twp.
Pg.366, #31-30, DUNCAN, James 63 SCT farmer $3600-$1329, parents of foreign birth
Margaret 55 IRE keeping house, parents of foreign birth
George 26, David 21 CAN farmers, parents of foreign birth
Matilda 15 CAN at home, parents of foreign birth
Adam 12 CAN farm hand, parents of foreign birth
Margaret 10 CAN at school, parents of foreign birth
William 30 CAN farmer $300-$740, parents of foreign birth
Mary 23 CAN keeping house, parents of foreign birth
John W. 11/12 IA b.Sept., parents of foreign birth
Pg.366, #33-32, DUNCAN, William 30 W.CANADA farmer $2000-$1060, parents of foreign birth
Ester 23 CAN.WEST keeping house, parents of foreign birth
Ida (f) 4 WI, parents of foreign birth
Johile (m) 3, Charles 10/12 b.Sept. IA, parents of foreign birth
Legrand Twp.
Pg.388, #11-11, DUNCAN, Jonah 37 OH harness maker $2500-$300
Sarah 27 OH housekeeper
Clara 10, Rosa B. 6, Mary E. 5 IA attends school
D.M.L. (m) 2 IA at home
"DUNCAN, --" (m) 2/12 b.Apr. IA
Liscomb Twp.
Pg.401, #14-15, MIDDLETON, John 41 IN farmer $0-$600
Manerva 30 IN keeping house
Andrew 14 IN works on farm
Margaret 11 IN at home
DUNCAN, John 10, Emma 9 IN at home
Pg.403, #41-42, PERRIN?, Eyra (m) 37 PA farmer $6400-$1800
Mary 33 NY keeping house
DUNCAN, John 10 IN at home
OLIVER, John 34 SCT farm laborer, parents of foreign birth
HALL, John 30 ENG farm laborer, parents of foreign birth
Marshalltown, 3rd Ward
Pg.469, #5-5, BRADLEY, John 33 CT lawyer $3000-$1000
Sarah 32 PA keeping house
Charles 8, Henry 5 IA at home
DUNCAN, Jessee (m) 62 PA bookkeeper $0-$300
LINGERIE, Calie (f) 22 SWEden domestic servant, parents of foreign birth
"Reports of cases in law and equity determined in the Supreme Court of the State of Iowa" ("Iowa Reports") by W. Penn Clarke, reporter, Vol.8, pgs.337 to 340 (California State Law Library, Sacramento, 12/2003; MAD's extract)
DUNCAN v. HOBART et al; Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines; 8 Iowa 337; June, 1859, Decided.
Appeal from the Marshall District Court. FRIDAY, APRIL 15. THIS was a "civil action in the district court," commenced in September, 1858, to foreclose a mortgage, under chapter 118 of the Code. As required by the petition, defendants answered under oath. To this answer, there was a demurrer, which was sustained. Another answer was then filed, duly verified, "admitting the justice of the plaintiff's claim." Defendants then moved to continue the cause until the next term, for the reason that no judgment could legally be entered, until after one continuance. This motion was overruled, and judgment entered for the amount found due plaintiff, ordering a foreclosure, and awarding a special execution against the property. Defendants appeal.
(opinion) WRIGHT, C. J. -- It is objected that the demurrer to defendant's first answer, was improperly sustained. Without examining this answer, we dismiss it with the remark, that if the rule that a party, by answering over, waives his right to make such an objection in this court, should ever be rigorously enforced, it should be in a case like this, where the second answer admits, under oath, the entire justness and correctness of the plaintiff's claim. After this admission, there was nothing left of law or fact to try; for the right of the plaintiff to recover, in manner and form as prayed for in his petition, was fully conceded.
And this brings us to the second question presented by appellants, and that is, was it proper, against defendant's objection, to enter judgment at the first term. The Code provides (section 1763), that, "except when otherwise provided, causes shall be tried at the first term after they are commenced, unless reasonable cause for a continuance be shown." This section was amended by chap. 127, of Laws of 1857-8, 249, by substituting second for first before "term," but retaining every other word of the section. In our opinion, the law of 1858 was not designed to continue every cause to the second term after its commencement. By section 1737 of the Code, a defendant is required to demur, or answer, or both, on or before the morning of the second day of the term at which he is required to appear, unless the court, by general rule, or special order, otherwise direct; and then, by section 1824, it is provided that, if the defendant fail to file his answer, or other pleading, by the time prescribed, judgment by default may, on motion of the plaintiff, be entered against him. As we understand these sections, a class of cases is provided for, different from those contemplated by the law of 1858. Section 1763, of the Code, gave the general rule, that causes should be tried at the first term after they were commenced. The language of the section, however, clearly recognizes exceptions to this rule; for it is said, "except where otherwise provided, causes shall be tried at," &c. One exception is to be found, where there has been a return of "not found," and an order of publication is necessary; for the delivery of the original notice to the sheriff, with intent that it be served immediately, is a commencement of the action. Section 1663. So the law of 1858 gives the general rule, that causes shall be tried at the second term after they are commenced. But exceptions to the rule are recognized, still; for it is said, "except where otherwise provided, causes shall be tried," &c. Now, if there is a default, or a failure to answer or demur, by the time required by the law, or the order or rule of court, the plaintiff is entitled to his default, and to his judgment. Such a case would fall among the excepted ones, and should not be continued to another term. And the same is true, in a more emphatic sense, where the defendant, by his answer, admits the truth or justice of the plaintiff's claim. It amounts, substantially, if not technically, to a confession in open court. And here we are brought to consider the meaning of the word "tried," as found in the amendatory act. If a plaintiff's cause of action is admitted, there is nothing to try. And why shall a cause be continued for trial, when, from its pleadings, there is nothing to litigate? In such a case, to say that the plaintiff must wait another term, would make the law an engine of delay to an extent that would bring it into just and merited reproach. If it was intended to make the first an appearance term for all cases, it would have been easy to have said so. As it is, the intention was, as we infer from the language used, to continue to the second term after their commencement, the trial on contested cases, and not those in which there was a default, or in which the whole cause of action was admitted.
Finally, it is urged that there was error in decreeing the foreclosure of defendant's equity of redemption. And here appellants raise the question, whether, under our law, the mortgagor has the right to redeem, after the rendition of the judgment, or the sale of the mortgaged premises. The question is one of very general importance -- has been very hastily presented by counsel -- and as we do not deem its disposition necessarily involved in the determination of the present cause, we conclude to leave it open until more directly and fully involved and discussed in some subsequent case. As we understand the judgment, in this case, it follows substantially the provisions of the Code. It does not undertake to bar and foreclose, absolutely and at once, the defendant's right to redeem. Whether such an order could be made, or the effect of it when made, seems not to have entered into the consideration of the court, at the time of rendering judgment. This much is very clear, that it was, at least, not intended to cut off the right to redeem before the sale under the special execution; and as to the effect of the sale upon this right, the judgment is equally silent. We say that the right to redeem before the sale, is not cut off. And this is manifest from the very fact of ordering the sale. This is the means provided by the law, and contemplated by this judgment, to enforce the collection of the mortgagee's debt. And to accomplish this seems to have been the object and purpose of the judgment. Beyond this, the court did not go -- nor was it necessary.
Judgment affirmed.
Pension Index Card File, alphabetical; of the Veterans Administrative Contact and Administration Services, Admin. Operations Services, 1861-1934; Duff to A-J Duncan (negative FHL film 540,888, some cards very faint); Joseph Duncan to Dunn (positive FHL film 540,889, some cards very dark)
Cataloged under Civil War, 1861-1865, pensions, indexes; does not say if Confederate or Federal, but probably Federal. Negative film, some cards much too faint or dark to read, some cards blurred or faded, particularly the service unit and the dates of application. Most of the very faint or dark cards were in a slightly different format, with space for years enlisted and discharged which were sometimes filled in. Many of these were for service in later years, although one or two were for service ca 1866.
Name of soldier, alias, name of dependent widow or minor, service (military unit or units), date of filing, class (invalid or widow or minor or other), Application #, Certificate #, state from which filed (sometimes blank), attorney (sometimes blank, MAD: did not usually copy), remarks. Sometimes the "Invalid" or "Widow" class had an "s" added to it before the application #; occasionally the area for the service information included a circled "S". The minor's name was frequently that of the guardian rather than the minor.
The military unit was frequently the Company Letter, the Regiment Number, sometimes US Vet Vol Inf. (US Veteran Volunteer Infantry), L.A. (Light Artillery), H.A. (Heavy Artillery), US C Inf (US Colored? Infantry), Cav. (Cavalry), Mil. Guards, V.R.C. (?Volunteer Reserve Corps?), etc. Sometimes there were several service units given.
Cards appear to be arranged by the last name, first name, middle initial if any, and state (including "US") of service.
Duncan, Elias J.; A 6 Iowa Cav.; 1885 Feb. 13, Invalid Appl. #532336, Cert. #522793. (MAD: 1860 Marshall Co. IA census)
Duncan, Rufus W., widow Duncan, Mary J.; C 51 Ill. Inf.; 1872 Jan. 5, Invalid Appl. #171532, Cert. #126057; 1909 July 26, Widow Appl. #924418, Cert. #687998, Iowa. (MAD: Rufus H. Duncan, Knox Co. IL; 1880 Cherokee Co. IA; 1900 Marshall Co. IA)
END
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